Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Ontological relativity: One cannot be certain that others structure the world ontologically (divide into objects) as we do, since this cannot be determined empirically. (See H. Lauener Quine, 1982, p. 153). According to Quine, however, the problem is only interesting for infinite domains, since one could specify the objects in the form of lists for finite domains. (See W.V.O. Quine, “Ontologische Relativität”, 2003, p. 78)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Ontological Relativity - Dictionary of Arguments
II 205 Relativization/Relative/Absolute/Quine/Field: Ontological Relativity to a background language. - Disanalogy: Locations can only be understood by relations of objects. - But that does not apply to words - there is no "linguistic relation" that would exclude the indeterminacy. Real indeterminacy/Field: E.g. no fact decide which translation of Newton’s "mass" is the best. (Net mass or relativistic mass). - E.g. a) pulse = mass times velocity and b) mass invariant (independent of the reference system) the two are mutually exclusive. Solution: mass denotes partly the one and partly the other. >Partial denotation. II 208 Agreement: is not a question of empirical linguistics. >Cf. >Agreement. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Ontological Relativity
